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All wars generate controversy, though
some more so than others. The current
US-led intervention in Iraq and the
catastrophic explosion of ethnic violence
it incited is especially contentious. Whilst
acrimonious disagreement over the raison
d’etre of the Iraq war persists in capitals
around the world, few deny that it has
been an especially bloody and traumatic
experience for Iraqi civilians. The full
extent of suffering is confirmed in this
week’s PLoS Medicine, which features an
article by Madelyn Hicks and colleagues
who consider the human costs of Iraq’s
war by focusing on civilian deaths between
2003 and 2008 [1].
While offering fresh new insights on the
nature and extent of violence in the
country, this is not the first article that
has considered deaths arising from the
Iraqi conflict [2–4]. Nor is it likely to be
the last. Rather, it should be set alongside
a growing cannon of work originating
from public health sciences and conflict
studies devoted to examining the human
consequences of the Iraq war. But the
focus and time period investigated by
Hicks and colleagues is significant: they
track the characteristics of 92,000 direct
civilian deaths occurring during the start,
escalation, and dramatic reduction of war-
related violence. In this respect, their
article builds on and goes beyond assess-
ments undertaken in the recent past.
The Costs of War
Though armed conflict has persisted for
tens of thousands of years, preoccupation
with the costs of war in terms of human
pain and suffering is a phenomenon of the
modern era. The first truly international
response to the human suffering generated
by warfare emerged following the Battle of
Solferino around the middle of the 19th
century, when more than 160,000 Aus-
trian troops did battle with 156,000
French and allied forces on Italian soil.
Horrified by the savagery inflicted by
combatants on one another, a Swiss
banker, Jean-Henri Dunant, initiated a
process that led to the Geneva Conven-
tions and the establishment of what
eventually became known as the Interna-
tional Red Cross and Red Crescent
movement.
Public awareness of the impacts of
warfare on human wellbeing expanded
during the massive international and
internal wars of the 20th century. There
was mounting concern not just for soldiers
wounded and dying in battle, but also for
the devastating implications of large-scale
industrial warfare on civilians. Until at
least the 1950s and 1960s, the aerial
bombardment and often indiscriminate
targeting of citizens was treated by leaders
as a regrettable, but in some cases
unavoidable, form of collateral damage.
A remarkable shift in attitude followed the
end of Cold War, owing in part to the
growing influence of the global media in
shaping the understanding of and respons-
es to the world’s war-affected hot spots.
Today there are considerable awareness
and consensus about the causes and
consequences of armed conflict in the
roughly two dozen countries presently
affected. Since the 1990s a veritable
industry has developed, dedicated to
measuring and monitoring the casualties
brought about by civil war. There are
literally dozens of research centers and
initiatives littered throughout North and
South America, Western Europe, and
Australia devoted to the task of tracking
the incidence of mortality and morbidity,
many of them applying broadly similar
methods. Most scholars now agree that
while most 21st century wars are nasty and
brutish, they are in fact declining in
number and intensity [5].
The Controversies about
Counting Methods
Notwithstanding widespread commit-
ment among health and conflict specialists
to bear witness and make public the real
costs of war, there is comparatively less
consensus about how such accounting
ought to be pursued. There are in fact
fundamental disagreements about the
most appropriate methodological ap-
proach to counting ‘‘conflict deaths,’’
whether amongst soldiers or civilians.
Scholars involved in collecting data and
estimating the incidence of violent death
rapidly divided into two camps: the incident
reporters and the survey administrators. Dis-
agreements between these two groups are
by no means trivial—they have profound
implications on how the pathways of
armed conflict are assessed and the scale
and distribution of their impact are
determined, and on the way solutions are
constructed and implemented.
Very generally, most social scientists
favor incident reporting that documents
the number of people dying as a result of
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authoritative media reports, independent
studies, morgues, hospitals, clinics, and a
range of available non-governmental
agency sources. Although incident report-
ers are keenly aware of the selection biases
that can be introduced into their analysis,
the distortions generated by missing data,
and the potential for censoring, they
nevertheless contend that incident report-
ing offers critical insights. Trained in both
the health and social sciences, Hicks and
her co-authors are devoted proponents of
this approach. Alongside their work are
recent innovations such as the Armed
Conflict Location and Events Dataset
(ACLED), which reveals geospatial and
temporal patterns of violence as well as
situational analysis of events and vectors
[6].
On the other side are epidemiologists
and public health experts who favor the
use of probabilistic sampling and survey-
based approaches. Recognizing that in
most countries vital registration data are
weak and incident reporting uneven,
survey administrators routinely invest in
retrospective and prospective surveys to
assess all manner of vulnerabilities, includ-
ing the risk or fact of death and injury.
The approach typically involves the ran-
domized sampling of households in con-
flict zones in order to obtain basic data on
family size, adult and child mortality rates,
and causes of death. A number of such
surveys have been undertaken in Iraq
since 2003 [7–9]. The World Health
Organization (WHO), along with projects
such as the standardized monitoring and
assessment of relief and transition
(SMART) and complex emergency data-
base (CE-DAT) are exponents of this latter
approach.
Since the onset of the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars, the debate on the human costs
of armed conflict have become more
heated [10–13]. Researchers have suc-
ceeded in drawing considerable public
attention to the ways in which warfare
yields devastating consequences, in both
intended and unintended ways. Yet there
are still some unresolved questions about
whether war deaths are increasing or
decreasing globally and over time
[14,15]. Equally intense disagreement
persists between the incident reporters
and survey monitors concerning the meth-
odological validity of the others meth-
ods—particularly their underlying as-
sumptions about baseline mortality rates,
the nature and distribution of violence,
sampling procedures, and latent biases in
reporting [16,17].
Where We Stand in Iraq
The debates over how many people
have been killed since 2003 in Iraq—and
who did the killing—are of critical impor-
tance in setting the record straight. It is
only through the generation of reliable
and valid analysis that decision-makers
and their armed forces can be held to
account and that any form of meaningful
lessons can be taken from such human-
made disasters. Fortunately, Hicks and her
colleagues extend the analysis beyond the
numbers by applying a ‘‘dirty war index’’
(DWI) [18], which measures the propor-
tion of women and children killed during
hostilities. Their conclusions make for
disturbing reading: while observing an
escalation of extrajudicial killings and the
use of mortars and vehicle bombs by
unknown perpetrators, they attribute a
high DWI to coalition and anti-coalition
forces alike.
It is worth recalling that while counting
the human toll of war in conflict zones
such as Afghanistan, Colombia, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, and
Sudan are of great importance, the true
magnitude of the toll should not be
underestimated. As survey administrators
well know, the impacts of warfare extend
well beyond the number of soldiers and
civilians killed and injured on or near the
battlefield. While it is extremely challeng-
ing to access insecure areas, public health
specialists recognize that the vast propor-
tion of mortality and morbidity arising
from war occurs indirectly, owing to easily
preventable diseases such as dysentery and
measles, as well as malnutrition. Death
rates are aggravated by the collapse of
basic health infrastructure, adequate food
and shelter, clean water, and other basic
needs. Developing a full accounting of the
costs of warfare, while difficult, is both an
obligation and responsibility.
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